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Abstract
We study a model of collective reputation and use it to analyze the benefit of
collective brands. Consumers form beliefs about the quality of an experience good that
is produced by one firm that is part of a collective brand. Consumers’ limited ability
to distinguish among firms in the collective and to monitor firms’ investment decisions
creates incentives to free-ride on other firms’ investment efforts. Nevertheless, we show
that collective brands induce stronger incentives to invest in quality than individual
brands under two types of circumstances: if the main concern is with quality control
and the baseline reputation of the collective is low, or if the main concern is with
the acquisition of specialized knowledge and the baseline reputation of the collective
is high. We also contrast the socially optimal information structure with the profit
maximizing choice of branding if branding is endogenous. Our results can be applied
to country-of-origin, agricultural appellation, and other collective brands.
∗Neeman: Tel Aviv University (e-mail: zvika@post.tau.ac.il). Öry: Yale School of Management (e-mail:
aniko.oery@yale.edu). Yu: Yale School of Management (e-mail: jungju.yu@yale.edu). We thank Joyee
Deb, Anthony Dukes, Johannes Hörner, Larry Samuelson, Jiwoong Shin, K. Sudhir, Robert Zeithammer for
helpful comments. We also thank seminar participants at McGill University, the FTC and Marketing Science
economic conference on consumer protection, the SICS conference at Berkeley, the University of Munich,
and Yale University.
1 Introduction
A product’s country of origin indicates something about its quality. How does such a col-
lective brand operate, and how can it sustain its brand value? Why, for example, does the
car manufacturer Volkswagen advertise “The power of German engineering” and so many
successful Chinese suppliers emphasize their country of origin, while the German appliance
manufacturer Bosch uses the non-country specific slogan “made for life”? Collective brands
are also prevalent in many other domains, such as in the form of appellations.
A brand, defined as “a unique design, sign, symbol, words, or combination of these, em-
ployed in creating an image that identifies a product and differentiates it from its competi-
tors,”1 can be thought of as a means to build a good reputation. When building reputation,
a firm faces a moral hazard problem; its investment in quality is unobservable to current
consumers, and the reputational return on its investment can only be collected in the future.
The benefits of good reputation differ in a collective brand and an individual brand. At
first glance, collective brands may seem like a bad idea. If several firms operate under one
brand name, each firm has an incentive to free-ride on other firms? investments. Moreover, a
firm?s investment in its own quality creates a weaker impact on the brand value of a collective
brand because consumers are uncertain whether quality is generated by the firm itself or one
of the other firms in the brand. Thus, the “precision” of the signal that is generated by a
firm’s investment in quality is lower in a collective brand, weakening the incentive to invest
in quality.
Nevertheless, under some circumstances, a collective brand can serve as a commitment
device for investment in high quality. If a brand is very successful (possibly as a result of
previous large investments), then a firm might be discouraged from additional investment
because the returns from it become small. The firm can afford to rest on its laurels, so
to speak. Analogously, if a brand develops a bad reputation (possibly as a result of no
investment), then returns on investment are also low, and the firm might give up investment
1This definition is taken from BusinessDictionary.Com.
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altogether. As we show, collective brands can mitigate these “discouragement effects” faced
by individual firms after very good or very bad histories by making extreme beliefs about
the value of the brand less likely.
Exactly how extreme the beliefs about a brand can be depends both on the structure of
signals that consumers obtain about firms? investments in quality and the baseline reputa-
tion of firms in the industry. For example, in manufacturing, quality control is important,
and consumers can easily learn that a firm is incompetent (or has failed to invest) when a
product has been observed to have a low quality. In contrast, in industries that require some
exclusive knowledge about, for example, a technology, a good quality realization reveals that
a firm possesses that technology and is a “competent type.”
We analyze a model of reputation that can incorporate both individual brands and col-
lective brands with multiple firms in the vein of Mailath and Samuelson (2001). The model
has the following features. Time is discrete. There are two types of firms, competent and
incompetent. In every period, only competent firms have the option to invest in quality.
Consumers observe the qualities of past products, which are noisy signals of past investment
decisions. Given these features, competent types can differentiate themselves from incom-
petent types by investing over time and producing higher quality products. If consumers
believe that competent types invest, then they infer that a firm with good signals is indeed
more likely to be competent. As a result, they are willing to pay more for goods produced
by firms with better past signals. This, in turn, provides an incentive for a competent firm
to invest in quality.
Accordingly, we define a firm’s reputation as the consumers’ posterior belief that it is
competent. The best possible equilibrium from a welfare point of view is the one in which
competent firms invest after each and every history, and we call the equilibrium in which
this is the case the reputational equilibrium. In most of the paper, we restrict our analysis to
the properties of this equilibrium. As pointed out by Mailath and Samuelson (2001), such
an equilibrium exists only if beliefs are bounded. If beliefs are not bounded, then as the
2
competent type continues to invest and to generate favorable signals, consumers eventually
learn almost perfectly that the firm must be competent. This destroys the firm’s incentive
to invest, which leads to a collapse of the reputational equilibrium. This cannot happen in
our model because we assume that consumers’ memory is finite and limited to the last T
periods only, as in Moav and Neeman (2010).2 In the main part of the paper, we focus on
the case where T = 2, but we show that our results hold for any finite T ≥ 2.3
The timing of our model of collective reputation, which is a natural extension of the basic
model used in the literature, is the following. Firms’ types are independently drawn from
a given distribution once and for all. In each period, a short-lived consumer is randomly
matched with one firm. If firms establish themselves as individual brands, then consumers
observe firm-specific past signals. If firms establish themselves as a collective brand, then
consumers observe signals only at the brand level, and they cannot tell whether the signal
is generated by the firm with which they have been matched in any specific period.
The reputational equilibrium exists in these environments if the benefit of investment
exceeds its cost after every possible history. A firm has both short-run and long-run incentives
to invest or refrain from investment. In the short-run, a firm may want to exploit its current
reputation. In the long-run, a firm may want to free-ride on future efforts by itself and other
members of the brand. Collective reputation can improve the short-run incentives to invest
because the best possible collective reputation is weaker than the best possible individual
reputation, and so the incentive to cash in on existing good reputation is weaker. However,
the very fact that the best possible individual reputation is better than the best possible
collective reputation also implies that individual reputation induces stronger incentives to
invest in the long-run. It allows the firm to establish a stronger individual reputation in the
2Mailath and Samuelson (2001) assume instead that firms exit the market and are replaced by new firms
whose types are drawn from some distribution. Another alternative is to assume that a firm’s type changes
randomly over time, as discussed in Holmström (1999). In this paper, we make the assumption of bounded
memory because it allows us to compute the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the
reputational equilibrium in a closed form, which we use to compare two models of reputation (individual
and collective). This assumption captures the nature of the market’s limited memory and/or the inattention
paid to the very distant past.
3The case where T = 1 is too simple and does not allow a firm to develop an history dependent reputation.
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future, and the firm does not have the option of free-riding on another firm?s investments.
In the case of “quality control,” the discouragement effect is stronger for individual
brands after a firm has produced low quality because in this case consumers infer that the
firm is likely to be incompetent, regardless of what else is observed or will be observed in the
future. We show that in this case, collective reputation can help overcome the firm?s moral
hazard problem if the baseline reputation for the firm or brand is low. This is because if
baseline reputation is low, then observation of a good signal in the next period moves beliefs
significantly in the case of a collective brand. It indicates that, despite the fact that one firm
has been shown to be incompetent, other firms in the brand may be competent.
In the case of “exclusive knowledge,” we show that a collective brand induces stronger
incentives to invest than an individual brand if the baseline reputation for the brand is
high. The reason is that it is easier for a competent individual firm to re-establish its good
reputation after cashing in on an individual brand than for a firm that is part of a collective
brand. Even if consumers observe high signals, it is still possible that some members of the
brand are incompetent. This implies that firms who own individual brands have a stronger
incentive to shirk than firms that belong to a collective brand.
It is important to note that in order for collective reputation to function as a commitment
device, investment decisions cannot be made too frequently, or equivalently, the discount
factor cannot be too large. This is because a firm would have a stronger incentive to free-ride
on future efforts by itself or other members of the brand with collective reputation (long-run
incentive). Thus, the short-run advantage of collective reputation can only outweigh the
long-run free-riding incentive if firms do not care too much about the future.
Finally, we also address the issue of brand formation. If firms can freely choose with whom
to brand, then it is important to understand whether the commitment value of a collective
brand is sufficiently strong to encourage a competent firm to brand with an incompetent firm.
We show that in an economy with high base reputation, a competent firm in an industry that
requires exclusive knowledge always wants to brand with other firms irrespective of whether
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they are competent or not. In contrast, in the quality control case, firms do never want to
brand with other firms in an economy with low base repuation, even though it is socially
optimal. This suggests that in developing countries, government enforcement of country of
origin labeling can be useful for quality control industries, if moral hazard is a major concern.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the related literature.
In Section 3, we set up the model and discuss the equilibrium concept. Section 4 presents
an example that highlights the main trade-offs and intuition of our analysis. In Section
5, we investigate the existence of the reputational equilibrium for individual and collective
brands separately and then show under which circumstances collective brands can serve as
a commitment device. We analyze firms? incentives to brand together in Section 6 and
the case where T ≥ 2 in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a discussion of the
interpretation and implications of our results. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our work is related to the theoretical economics literature on reputation, as well as to the
literature on umbrella branding, country-of-origin and career concerns.
The theoretical work on reputation that is most relevant to our paper is Mailath and
Samuelson (2001). They study the case of an individual reputation, and consider a firm that
sells an experience good to consumers over an infinite discrete time horizon where the firm’s
investment decision is unobserved by consumers. Only the competent (as opposed to inept)
type of the firm can invest in quality, and so the production of high quality products provides
a noisy signal of the firm’s investment decision. Mailath and Samuelson (2001) assume that
in every period the firms exits the market with a certain probability and can unobservably
sell its reputation to a new entrant. This formulation makes it hard to explicitly calculate
the threshold cost below which the firm invests in quality so we follow Moav and Neeman
(2010) and assume instead that consumers have a finite memory, and extend the standard
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model of individual reputation to accommodate collective brands.
Research that identifies the benefits of collective reputation is scarce. One exception is
Fishman et al. (2014) In their model an individual firm can only generate one signal per
period. Hence a collective brand that includes many firms can send many signals in every
period and so provide better information to consumers. Fishman et al. (2014) show that
this informational benefit outweighs firms’ incentive to free-ride on other firms’ investment
efforts as long as the number of brand members is not too large. However, they consider
a two-period model where firms’ investment decision is made once-and-for-all in the first
period, thus they abstract away from issues of commitment and dynamic trade-offs, which
are the we focus of our analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, Tirole (1993) is the first to formalize an analytical model
of collective reputation in context of a large organization. There, the group reputation is an
aggregate of individual reputations. Each member’s reputation is determined by its noisily
observed past behavior as well as the group’s track record. The complementarity between
the group’s reputation and current incentives of its members can give rise to multiple steady
state equilbria. Given a good track record of the group, members have incentives to maintain
the good reputation, and hence a “low corruption” steady state arises. But, starting with a
bad record, the group is locked into a “high corruption” steady state.4
Collective reputation has also been studied in the context of umbrella branding in which
an existing brand name is extended to a new product line. Wernerfelt (1988), Choi (1998),
Cabral (2000), Miklós-Thal (2012), and Moorthy (2012) have examined the incentives that
a monopolist has to signal quality by pooling reputation for different products. Others
have considered settings where free-riding incentives are more pronounced. Zhang (2015)
examines country-of-origin labelling. He shows that the ability to free-ride on other firms’
quality investments implies that high quality firms have an incentive to dissociate themselves
from the country-of-origin, which in turn mitigates free-riding and can improve the reputation
4Levin (2009) extends Tirole (1993) by considering the case where the cost of high effort evolves stochas-
tically over time.
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for the group. Bar-Isaac (2007) investigates an overlapping generations model in the moral
hazard-in-teams framework á la Holmstrom (1982). With a career concern present, senior
entrepreneurs looking to sell the firm in the next period have an incentive to work hard and
to hire young juniors who need to build reputation. Finally, Fleckinger (2014) considers
collective reputation under Cournot competition where consumers only learn the average
quality in the market. He studies the effect of the number of firms on welfare, and shows
that quality is decreasing in the number of firms whereas quantity increases.
3 The Model
Basics. We consider a market with two firms that produce a vertically differentiated expe-
rience good, that can be of either good (G) or bad (B) quality, at zero cost. In every period,
t ∈ {. . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . . }, one short-lived consumer with unit demand arrives and is randomly
matched with one of the firms.5
Each firm is competent (C) with probability µ or incompetent (I) with probability 1−µ,
independently of the other firm. We interpret µ as the baseline reputation of firms in the
economy. Firms’ types are unobservable to consumers. After being matched with a consumer,
a competent firm can invest by incurring a cost of c > 0 in order to increase the probability
that its product is of good quality.6 If a competent firm invests in period t, then its product
has good quality (G) with probability πH . If it does not invest, then the product has
good quality with probability πL, with πL < πH . An incompetent firm cannot invest and
also produces good quality with probability πL. Consumers do not observe firm’s investment
decisions, but they can observe the quality of goods produced in the last two periods through
word-of-mouth or consumer reviews.7 Using this information, they update their beliefs about
the type of the firm they are matched with. After the investment decision firms make a take-
5Thus, we abstract away from (price) competition between the two firms.
6The qualitative analysis and results would not change if we assumed that investments are made prior to
being matched. This specification simplifies the exposition of the firm’s Bellman equation.
7Alternatively, one can think of a long-lived consumer with limited memory.
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it-or-leave-it offer to the consumer.8 The consumer can either accept or reject the firm’s offer
and then it leaves the market.
Payoffs. We normalize the payoff of a consumer who does not buy the good to 0. If a
consumer accepts a price p, she receives a payoff of 1− p if the good is of good quality, and
−p otherwise. A firm that sells in period t at price pt receives a payoff or profit of vt = pt− c
at t if it invests at t and vt = pt if it does not. Firms discount future payoffs by δ ∈ (0, 1).
Information Structure. In every period, a consumer is assigned randomly to a firm.
With a collective brand, consumers cannot distinguish between the identities of the two
firms. This means that consumers obtain a signal about the brand in every period. If a firm
maintains an individual brand, a consumer does not receive a signal about the firm that he
is not matched with. Notice that the matching process ensures that the two firms sell the
same expected quantities under the two regimes. We assume that firms know each other’s
types.
It follows that the set of histories for an individual brand is
Hind = {G,B,∅}2
where ∅ represents a failure to match. The set of histories for a collective brand is
Hcol = {G,B}2.
We denote the quality of the good that was produced n periods ago by ht−n and the
history at time t by ht ≡ ht−2ht−1 ∈ Hb (b ∈ {ind, col}).
Equilibrium. We are interested in stationary equilibria in which strategies depend only
on the histories specified above. A stationary equilibrium is given by an investment and
pricing strategy of firms, a purchasing strategy of consumers, and consumers’ beliefs over
8This assumption guarantees that all surplus goes to the firm in equilibrium, which simplifies the analysis.
Firms must receive some surplus to have reputational concerns and for our results to hold.
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the type of the firm they are matched with. For simplicity, we assume that consumers always
purchase the good if it gives them a nonnegative expected payoff given their beliefs.
In the case of an individual brand, posterior beliefs given a history h ∈ Hind are given by a
probability Prind(C|h) that the firm is competent. In the case of a collective brand, posterior
beliefs are given by a probability distribution over the pair of types of the two firms. We
denote the posterior belief that the two firms’ types are s ∈ {C, I}2 given history h ∈ Hcol
by ηs(h) and so in the case of a collective brand the posterior belief that the matched firm
is competent given history h is Prcol(C|h) = ηCC(h) + 12(ηCI(h) + ηIC(h)). We define the
reputation of a brand – both individual and collective – to be consumers’ posterior beliefs. In
equilibrium, each player’s strategy maximizes its payoffs given other players’ strategies and
beliefs, and posterior beliefs are derived from the realized histories and the firms’ strategies
by Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
For most of the paper we focus our attention on the stationary equilibrium in which
competent firms invest in quality whenever they are matched with a consumer, after each
and every history. We call this the reputational equilibrium. This equilibrium is socially
optimal if and only if
∆π ≡ πH − πL ≥ c, (1)
which we assume to be satisfied throughout the paper. Note that this equilibrium is also the
brand profit-maximizing equilibrium in that case.
The game allows for the existence other equilibria. For example, a ”no investment”
equilibrium, in which a competent firm never invests in quality, always exists. We discuss
other equilibria in Section 6 where we discuss endogenous brand formation.
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4 Example
In order to intuitively understand the trade-offs present in our model, it is useful to think
about the following illustrative example.9 Consider two drivers, Adam and Brian, who
work for a company that provides limousine services. In every period, a consumer who
needs the service arrives and the company randomly assigns her to either Adam or Brian.
After the ride, the consumer posts a review about the quality of the ride on the company’s
website, which displays the last two reviews given by consumers. The company can decide
as a policy to reveal or conceal the names of the drivers on the reviews. In the former
policy, new consumers can check past records of individual drivers, so drivers are building
their reputation individually (individual brand). In the latter, consumers cannot distinguish
between two drivers’ records, so they are building a collective reputation (collective brand).
Each driver’s competency type is drawn independently so that he is competent with
a probability µ. Only competent drivers can exert effort at a cost c > 0 to provide a
good transportation service (G) with probability πH ∈ (0, 1). If they do not exert effort,
they are indistinguishable from the incompetent drivers in that they always provide a bad
transportation service (B), i.e., πL = 0. Consumers receive a payoff of 1 from a good
transportation service and 0 otherwise. This set-up corresponds to the “exclusive knowledge”
environment in which a good outcome reveals the driver’s competence. Since the company
makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to consumers, it can extract the entire consumer surplus
by charging their willingness to pay:
pb(h) = Prb(C|h)πH + (1− Prb(C|h))πL = Prb(C|h)πH
where b ∈ {ind, col} denotes the company’s policy on whether to reveal names of drivers, and
Prb(C|h) is the posterior probability that consumers assign to the driver being competent
9We thank Robert Zeithammer for suggesting this example.
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given history h. For simplicity, suppose µ = 1
2
and let πH approach 1.
10
History h Individual brand Collective brand
GG Prind(C|h) = 1 Prcol(C|h)→πH→1 56
G∅,∅G Prind(C|h) = 1 —
GB,BG Prind(C|h) = 1 Prcol(C|h)→πH→1 12
B∅,∅B Prind(C|h)→πH→1 0 —
BB Prind(C|h)→πH→1 0 Prcol(C|h)→πH→1 16
Table 1: Consumers’ beliefs Prb(C|h), b ∈ {ind, col}
As demonstrated in Table 1, consumers’ posterior beliefs are different for an individual
and a collective brand. Because πL = 0, a good outcome reveals the firm’s competence. So,
a consumer’s belief about an individual brand reaches 1 for any histories that contain a G,
and she pays the full price. But, in a collective brand, the type of the other firm remains
unknown. Also, consumers do not observe a firm’s identity, so uncertainty remains about
which of the two firms the consumer will be matched with. Therefore, a consumer’s belief is
bounded away from 1 and 0 even after the best and worst outcomes, respectively.
To study when and how a collective brand provides more incentives to invest in quality,
we examine when an individual and a collective brand sustain the reputational equilibrium.
Without loss of generality, we focus on Adam’s incentives. To make an investment decision
relevant for him, we assume that Adam is competent. We find conditions under which
investing is always his optimal decision by ruling out profitable single deviations. Suppose
that Adam is visited in period t and is endowed with a history ht = ht−2G where ht−2 ∈
{G,B}. He can either exert effort or deviate.
First, suppose Adam is an individual brand and exerts effort. This investment in quality
made in period t only affects payoffs in periods t + 1 (short-run) and t + 2 (long-run), as
its outcome will be observed starting in period t + 1 and forgotten by period t + 3. Given
πH ≈ 1, Adam’s history observed in period t + 1 will be ht+1 = GG. He makes a sale if
he is visited, which happens with a probability 1
2
. So, he expects to get 1
2
(pind(GG) − c).
10As we take the limit for πH → 1, beliefs are equivalent to prices. That is, lim
πH→1
pb(h) = Prb(C|h), which
are listed in Table 1.
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In period t + 2, Adam is visited with a probability 1
2
and the history can be ht+2 = GG or
G∅, depending on whether he was visited in period t+ 1. So, the long-run expected payoff
is 1
4
(pind(GG) − c) + 1
4
(pind(G∅) − c). Plugging in the beliefs from the table, the expected




























If Adam does not exert effort in period t, he saves the cost of effort at an expense of worse
reputation in the subsequent two periods. Given the history ht = ht−2G and πL = 0,
ht+1 = GB deterministically, and ht+2 = BG or B∅, depending on whether he is visited in



















= δ · 1− c
2
+ δ2 · 1− 2c
4
.
Subtracting this payoff from (δ+δ2)1−c
2
, we find δ
2
4
to be the benefit or return from investment
in period t. As long as this benefit is greater than the investment cost c, a deviation after
the history ht−2G is not profitable.
It is important to note that the short-run payoffs are the same whether Adam invests
or not in period t. Adam’s short-run concern is that by investing today, he can be paid a
higher price by improving ht+1 = ht−1ht. But, recall that Adam is endowed with the history
(ht = ht−2G), which includes a good outcome. Then, regardless of his investment decision,
ht+1 = GG or GB. In either case, a consumer’s belief about Adam in period t + 1 is 1,
so Adam is paid the full price. Thus, the short-run incentive for investment is zero. This
underscores the severe short-run moral hazard problem when Adam builds reputation by
himself; Adam wants to exploit his current reputation when it is very high.
The long-run incentive for investment remains positive because Adam wants to improve
ht+2 by investing today. If he knew that ht+1 was G, Adam would deviate and save the
investment cost now, because he will be paid the full price in period t+ 2 independent of his
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investment decision today. In other words, there is an incentive to free-ride on effort exerted
by his future-self. But since he might not be visited in period t + 1 while being visited in
period t+ 2, which happens with a probability 1
4
, Adam has an incentive to invest in period
t.






. At this point, we have considered all two-period histories and conclude
that the reputational equilibrium can be sustained if and only if the cost of investment is
















Next, we consider the case in which Adam and Brian are evaluated anonymously, which
corresponds to the case of a collective brand. Suppose that both are competent. We rule
out profitable single deviations for Adam, given Brian always exerts effort.
First we assume that the brand is endowed with a history ht = ht−2G and suppose
that Adam is visited in period t. If he invests, he produces G with a probability 1 and






. Then, in period t + 1,
since both drivers are competent, the brand produces a G independent of who provides the



















= δ · 5− 6c
12
+ δ2 · 5− 6c
12
.
If Adam deviates in period t by not exerting effort, ht+1 = GB and ht+2 = BG, resulting














= δ · 1− 2c
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In contrast to the individual brand, the short-run return on investment in the collective
brand does not vanish. As an anonymous driver in a group, Adam is never fully revealed to
be competent. Even if he is endowed with a good history, Adam has an incentive to exert
effort in order to be paid a higher price in period t + 1. More explicitly, if Adam invests in
period t, he can receive a price pcol(GG) = 5
6
instead of pcol(GB) = 1
2
.
Similarly, one can show that the return on investment given a history ht = ht−2B with
ht−2 ∈ {G,B} is also δ+δ
2
6
. Thus, the reputational equilibrium exists if and only if the cost
of investment c is less than or equal to δ+δ
2
6




on investment for an individual brand.
Consequently, if the reputational equilibrium exists for an individual brand, it also exists






only exists for a collective brand. This finding holds even in the case in which there is an
incompetent driver in a collective brand.11 So, the average quality of limousine service can be
improved if the company promotes drivers’ collective reputation by concealing the identity
of each driver.
Put differently, the collective brand provides drivers with commitment power to invest in
quality mainly by alleviating an individual brand’s moral hazard problem. Finally, the inter-
action between the short-run and long-run incentives implies that a collective brand induces
more investment efforts for a small δ, i.e., when short-run incentives are more important.
This is the case when producers are not too patient or investments are made infrequently.
We have thus far considered Adam’s investment incentives when the type of brands are
provided exogenously. Now, we examine whether Adam would like to form a collective brand









such that the reputational equilibrium exists only for a collective
brand. Then, Adam must first determine which equilibrium is feasible if he refuses to brand
11We do not consider the case where both drivers are incompetent because then for no driver is investing
a relevant decision. Only competent drivers can invest.
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with Brian.
One candidate stationary equilibrium is one in which Adam invests if and only if he
produced good quality in the previous period. In such an equilibrium, Adam will not invest
after outcome B or ∅, which makes the set {B,∅} an absorbing set with expected long-run
equilibrium profits equal to πL = 0.
Another candidate stationary equilibrium is one in which Adam invests if and only if the
last period’s outcome is either G or ∅. In such an equilibrium, if it exists, the short-run
incentive to invest after the realization B is larger than the short-run incentive to invest after
the realization G. This is the case because one good quality realization fully reveals that
Adam is competent, so additional investment makes no difference. Hence, this cannot be a
stationary equilibrium. Similarly, it is possible to show that no other stationary equilibrium
exists, except for the stationary equilibrium in which Adam never invests. Thus, if we restrict
attention only to stationary equilibria, the highest long-run profit that Adam can hope for
if he refuses to brand with Brian is 0.








then Adam always benefits from branding with Brian –
even if Brian is incompetent. This last conclusion is not true in general as we show in Section
6 below. The reason it fails to hold is that if µ is low the consumers’ willingness to pay for
the good may be lower than c, which can make investment so unattractive to Adam that he
would not want to invest even if investment is socially optimal.
The rest of the paper provides more detailed insights about when collective brands are
more attractive than individual brands from a social and private point of view by elaborating
on the role of the baseline reputation µ and the signal structure.
5 Reputational Equilibrium
As we exhibited in the example, the reputational equilibrium exists if and only if the cost
of investment is less than a threshold, which is equivalent to its benefit. We compare the
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threshold for an individual and a collective brand and identify conditions under which a
collective brand sustains a reputational equilibrium for a larger range of investment costs.
5.1 Individual Brand
In a reputational equilibrium, in which the firm invests after every history, the equilibrium
price after history ht = ht−2ht−1 ∈ Hind = {G,B,∅}2 is given by
pind(ht) = Pr
ind(C|ht) · πH + (1− Prind(C|ht)) · πL. (2)
The stationary structure of the model allows us to express all the equilibrium prices, namely
pind(GG), pind(GB), pind(BG), and pind(BB), in terms of the basic parameters of the model.














Lemma 1. The reputational equilibrium exists for an individual brand if and only if the cost
of investment c satisfies
c ≤ ĉind ≡ min
ht−1∈{G,B,∅}
c̄ind(ht−1)
where c̄ind(ht−1) denotes the expected benefit from investment given history ht = ht−2ht−1:

















Since investing should be the firm’s optimal decision after all histories, the equilibrium
exists if and only if the cost is less than the minimum of returns on investment across feasible
histories. Given the most recent outcome ht−1, the benefit from investment, c̄
ind(ht−1),
consists of a sum of price premiums that are obtained in the next two periods. The firm
enjoys a positive return on investment at t only if it leads to a better outcome (i.e., G instead
of B) and if it is visited again in at least one of the next two periods. Accordingly, the return
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on investment must be multiplied by ∆π; the short-run benefit obtained in period t+ 1 must
be multiplied by δ
2
; and the long-run benefit obtained in period t+ 2 must be multiplied by
δ2
4
. We also note from equation (3) that c̄ind(ht−1) does not depend on the entire history
ht = ht−2ht−1 because ht−2 will be forgotten by period t + 1 and is thus irrelevant to the
return from the investment.
In the short-run, the firm’s investment in period t can improve ht+1 = ht−1ht, which
allows for a price premium pind(ht−1G)− pind(ht−1B). But, had the firm reached a very high
or low reputation with ht−1, the firm’s additional investment would have a small influence
on the reputation, thus yielding a small price premium. So, the moral hazard problem arises
through the firm’s short-run incentive to exploit its current reputation.
In the long-run, an investment in period t can improve ht+2 = htht+1. The given history,
ht−1 is now irrelevant. Recall that under the reputational equilibrium, the firm is supposed







, respectively. Accordingly, the expected long-run benefit from investment
at t is a weighted sum over price premiums of a form pind(Ght+1)− pind(Bht+1), where each
term is weighted by the probability of ht+1. If the firm expects additional investment at
t + 1, which would make ht+1 more likely to be G, it has less incentive to exert effort at t.
In other words, the firm has an incentive to free-ride on its own future investment efforts,
which in turn reduces its long-run incentives to invest at t.
Figure 1 depicts ĉind as a function of the baseline reputation µ. The three dotted curves
represent c̄ind(ht−1) for ht−1 ∈ {G,B,∅} and the solid line represents ĉind. So, for any fixed
cost c, the values of µ where ĉind lies above c sustain the reputational equilibrium. One can
see that ĉind converges to zero at extreme values of µ, which implies that the reputational
equilibrium is harder to sustain. For extreme values of µ, consumers’ beliefs are not much
influenced by the brand’s history. Thus, the firm has weak incentives to incur the investment
cost. This commitment problem under extreme beliefs has been pointed out by Mailath and
Samuelson (2001). If µ is large, the firm is tempted to“rest on its laurels,” which we call
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Figure 1: Return on Investment (ROI) after each history and the minimum
πH = 0.975, πL = 0.025, δ = 0.4
the complacency effect. This effect is the strongest after good outcomes, i.e., ht−1 = G,
which generate the most extreme posterior beliefs. Thus, ĉind is attained for ht−1 = G. If µ
is small, then the firm simply gives up on improving its reputation, or the discouragement
effect. Then, the reputation plunges more following a bad outcome. So, ht−1 = B provides
the lowest return from investment. The following lemma provides the binding condition for
ĉind:
Lemma 2. If µ is sufficiently large, i.e.
µ ≥ πL(1− πL)
πH(1− πH) + πL(1− πL)
then ĉind = c̄ind(G). Otherwise, ĉind = c̄ind(B).
5.2 Collective Reputation
Consumers facing a collective brand cannot distinguish between the identities of individual
firms. They care about the expected quality of a randomly matched firm. Thus, by jointly
generating the group’s history observed by consumers, the firms share a common, collective
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reputation. Upon observing a history ht ∈ Hcol = {G,B}2, a consumer forms beliefs about
the quality of a random firm in the group, and is willing to pay
pcol(ht) = Pr
col(C|ht) · πH + (1− Prcol(C|ht)) · πL, (4)
which, as in the case of an individual brand, can be expressed in terms of the primitives of
the model. However, since posterior beliefs are different from those for an individual brand,


























Recall that firms’ competency is known to firms, but not to consumers. Payoffs depend
on the type of the other member, denoted θ ∈ {C, I}, and so do returns from investment.
Lemma 3. The reputational equilibrium exists for a collective brand if and only if the cost
of investment c satisfies




















denotes the expected benefit from investment given history ht = ht−2ht−1 and where π(θ)
denotes type θ’s probability of producing high quality upon exerting effort, that is π(θ) = πH
if θ = C and π(θ) = πL if θ = I.
Analogously to the individual brand, the short-run benefit from investment at t, obtained
in period t+ 1, is given by pcol(ht−1G)− pcol(ht−1B). The long-run benefit from investment
at t, obtained in period t+ 2, is a weighted sum of price premiums of the form pcol(Ght+1)−
pcol(Bht+1). The realization of ht+1 depends on the effort provided by the brand in that
period, which depends on which firm is visited and the type of the other firm. If θ = C, then
both members of the brand are competent and invest on equilibrium path in period t+ 1 if
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matched. But, if θ = I, then the brand invests only if the consumer at t+ 1 is matched with
the competent firm. So, the probability that ht+1 = G is
πH+π(θ)
2
where π(θ) = πH if θ = C,
and π(θ) = πL otherwise.
A collective brand with two competent firms generates more good outcomes than an
individual brand because the group invests in every period, whereas an individual brand
does not invest when it is not matched with a consumer. A member of a collective brand is
thus tempted to free-ride on the future investment of other members; today’s deviation can
be undone by tomorrow’s effort. This consideration suggests that a collective brand would
have weaker long-run incentives to invest than an individual brand.
If µ is large, the firm faces the commitment problem due to the complacency effect. This
problem becomes worse if the brand is endowed with a good outcome ht−1 = G and expects
more effort in the future, θ = C. Thus, (ht−1, θ) = (G,C) attains ĉ
col. If µ is small, the
commitment problem arises through the discouragement effect. This problem is more severe
if the brand is endowed with a bad outcome ht−1 = B and expects less effort in the futre,
θ = I. Consequently, (ht−1, θ) = (B, I) attains ĉ
col.
Lemma 4. For µ close to 1, ĉcol = c̄col(G,C), and for µ close to 0, ĉcol = c̄col(B, I).
The lemma identifies the binding condition for the threshold level for extreme values of
µ, which are the regions of focus in our further analysis.12 Figure 2 illustrates c̄col(ht−1, θ)
for (ht−1, θ) = (G,C) and (B, I) for given parameters.
5.3 Comparing Individual and Collective Brands
Having characterized the reputational equilibrium for an individual and a collective brand,
we now compare the two types of branding. That is, we identify sufficient conditions for
ĉind < ĉcol to be satisfied. We focus our analysis on two special signal structures that are
suggestive of two different industry types:
12Binding conditions for intermediate values of µ are more complicated and are analyzed in the lemma’s
proof in the appendix.
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Figure 2: Return on Investment under (G,C) and (B, I)
πH = 0.975, πL = 0.025, δ = 0.4
1. “Exclusive knowledge” (πL ≈ 0): If πL is very small, then it is nearly impossible to
produce good quality without investment. In this case, an observation of good quality
reveals that a firm is competent. This structure fits industries where competence
represents a possession of a special technology or expertise that is required of producing
high quality (e.g., for watches, automobiles, electronics, agriculture, etc.).
2. “Quality control” (πH ≈ 1): If πH is very large, then a firm can almost always
produce good quality if it invests. In this case, an observation of bad quality reveals that
a firm is incompetent. This assumption fits industries where competence represents
the ability to perform effective quality control, such as in the case of the manufacturing
of generic products (e.g., nuts and bolts, widgets, etc.).
In these two special cases, either a good or bad signal reveals the firm’s type completely.
That there is a revealing signal should be bad for short-run incentives, and especially so
for an individual brand; when endowed with an appropriate outcome (ht−1 = G or B), the
firm’s type is known, so the short-run incentive for investment vanishes. For example, for
exclusive knowledge, the short-run premium pind(GG) − pind(GB) = 1 − 1 = 0, and for
quality control, pind(BG) − pind(BB) = 0 − 0 = 0. However, the problem is mitigated for
a collective brand because of consumers’ limited observability. Though an outcome may
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reveal the type of a particular firm, the type of the other firm remains unknown. Since
consumers do know with which firm in the group they are matched with, the short-run
premium pcol(ht−1G)− pcol(ht−1B) is strictly positive for all ht−1.
Since short-run incentives for investment are greater for a collective brand, for small
enough δ, ĉcol > ĉind is satisfied. However, as noted before, an individual brand induces
stronger long-run incentives. This is because there is less future effort to free-ride on. Also,
since the firm is alone, the firm may not have an opportunity to recover the damaged repu-
tation after a deviation. Therefore, δ cannot be too large for ĉcol > ĉind to be true.
In the two extreme cases described above, the fact that one observation reveals compe-
tence or incompetence is bad for short-run incentives: strong evidence of competence induces
complacency, and strong evidence of incompetence is discouraging. We show that in both of
these cases, a collective brand may induce stronger incentives to invest than an individual
brand. The reason is that the most extreme beliefs about a collective brand are less extreme
than the most extreme beliefs about an individual brand, because there is always a possibil-
ity that other members of the collective brand are not as competent or incompetent as those
whose type has been revealed. Consequently, complacency and discouragement are also less
extreme in a collective brand, which can induce stronger incentives to invest.
This effect is particularly strong in the exclusive knowledge case if baseline beliefs µ are
high. The intuition is the following: If prior beliefs are close to 1, observing a good realization
moves beliefs further up - in the individual brand all the way to 1 - but posterior beliefs for
a collective and individual brand stay close. After such a good signal, beliefs do not shift
in the individual case even if a bad realization is observed. However, for a collective brand,
beliefs can drop a lot after a bad realization - far below the prior, i.e. incentives to invest in
the collective brand are much stronger than in an individual brand when the discouragement
effect is the strongest for an individual brand.
Finally, notice that a small δ ensures that short-run incentives dominate long-run in-
centives, which favors a collective brand relative to an individual brand. The following
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Figure 3: Comparison of Returns on Investment with πL = 0
πH = 0.7, δ = 0.4
proposition formalizes this intuition.
On the flip side, if µ is small under the exclusive technology, an individual brand is
provided with very strong incentive to invest and improve its reputation. By producing one
good outcome, the brand can fully reveal its competence. On the other hand, a collective
brand’s incentive declines as µ decreases. The limited observation of consumers limit the
extent to which the firms can improve the collective reputation by investing in quality.
Proposition 1 (Exclusive knowledge). Suppose that πL is sufficiently close to 0.
1. A collective brand sustains a reputational equilibrium for higher investment costs than
an individual brand (ĉcol > ĉind) if consumers’ prior belief µ about the firm’s type is
sufficiently high and δ is not too large.
2. An individual brand sustains a reputational equilibrium for higher investment costs
than a collective brand (ĉcol < ĉind) for sufficiently low µ.
Figure 3 illustrates the return on investment for given parameter values. It shows that a
collective brand dominates an individual brand for a wide range of priors µ.
The same intuition applies for the case of quality control. In this case, a collective brand
can alleviate the moral hazard problem of an individual brand the best if priors are low and
the firms discount time a lot in one period.
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Figure 4: Comparison of Returns on Investment with πH = 1
πL = 0.5, δ = 0.2
Proposition 2 (Quality control). Suppose that πH is sufficiently close to 1. Then, the
following holds:
1. A collective brand sustains a reputational equilibrium for higher investment costs than
an individual brand (ĉcol > ĉind) if consumers’ prior belief µ about the firm’s type is
sufficiently low and δ is not too large.
2. An individual brand sustains a reputational equilibrium for higher investment costs
than a collective brand (ĉcol < ĉind) for sufficiently high µ.
Figure 4 depicts the return on investment for collective and individual brands in the case
for given parameter values.
6 Brand Formation
Until now, we treated the brand structure as exogenously given which is a realistic assumption
in some applications: A country might legally require labeling of the country of origin and
the appellation label is determined by the physical location of the production site. We have
shown that collective brands can be a socially superior form of reputation building as they
can serve as a commitment device for investment. However, the wedge between the payoffs
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of a firm and social welfare implies that the firm may sometimes prefer to remain alone and
establish an individual reputation, in particular if the other firm is incompetent. In this
section we identify conditions under which competent firms prefer to group with another
(competent or incompetent) firm to staying alone.
To this end, we restrict attention to the parameter regions we identified in Propositions 1
and 2, so that a collective brand indeed induces more investment incentives than an individual
brand, i.e., ĉind < c < ĉcol.
6.1 Stationary Equilibria for Individual Brands
We first investigate which stationary equilibria exist for an individual brand when investment
costs c are so high that the reputational equilibrium does not exist. Recall that the set of
relevant histories is given by Hind = {G,∅, B}2. A stationary equilibrium strategy specifies
a mapping from the set of relevant histories into a decision of whether to invest or not. It
can be characterized by a subset S ⊂ Hind of histories after which a competent firm invests.
As we noted in Lemma 1, the return from investment only depends on the outcome of the
previous period, i.e., there can be at most 23 = 8 candidates for stationary equilibria. The no
investment equilibrium, where competent firms never invest, always exists. The reputational
equilibrium is represented by the set S = Hind and the no investment equilibrium by S = ∅.
Six other candidate stationary equilibria remain to be considered: S = {G,∅}, {G}, {∅, B},
{B}, {G,B}, and {∅}. In the next lemma, we identify which equilibria exist under exclusive
technology and quality control. In the former, we show that the no investment equilib-
rium is the unique equilibrium, while in the latter, we show that the additional equilibrium
S = {G,∅} always exists and the equilibrium S = {G} sometimes exist.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the reputational equilibrium exists for a collective brand but not for
an individual brand, that is ĉind < c < ĉcol.
1) Exclusive knowledge: If πL is close to 0 and µ is close to 1, then the only equilibrium
that exists for an individual brand is the “no investment” equilibrium where a competent firm
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never invests.
2) Quality control: If πH is close to 1 and µ is close to 0, then
i) S = {G,∅} exists for ĉind < c < ĉcol.





Note that in that case, ĉind < c < ĉcol if and only if δ < 2πL
3+πL
.
Why do the two equilibria S = {G,∅} and S = {G} do not exist under exclusive
knowledge? For both equilibria, the firm’s optimal decision following a bad outcome is to
not invest. Knowing this, consumers pay a low price πL to the firm who produced a bad
quality in the previous period. At the same time, a firm that just produced a good outcome
is maximally rewarded with a price πH because it reveals the firm’s competence. Given this
low profit followed by a bad outcome, the firm is tempted to exert effort and produce a
good outcome, in expectation of higher profits in the future. Since deviation is an attractive
option, sustaining this equilibrium requires cost of investment c that is larger than ĉind, i.e.,
c 6∈ (ĉind, ĉind). Therefore, S = {G,∅} and {G} do not exist.
In the case of quality control, the equilibrium S = {G,∅} always exists and S = {G}
may exist for sufficiently large δ. This is because a deviation following a bad outcome is less
attractive, supporting the equilibrium for c ∈ (ĉind, ĉind). In particular, a good outcome is
not revealing so that the reward from an investment is low relative to the cost.
6.2 Profits and Endogenous Brand Formation
Next, we compare the firm’s best feasible expected profit in each equilibrium, which is de-
termined by the investment strategy and stationary distribution over realized histories. In
any stationary equilibrium, the brand’s history evolves according to the equilibrium invest-
ment strategy and the signal realizations. For example, consider the stationary equilibrium
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where the first row describes the probabilities of outcomes G,∅, and B, respectively, when
the most recent history is G, the second row describes the same respective probabilities if
the most recent history is ∅, and the third row describes these same probabilities if the most
recent history is B. We denote the probability of outcome G in the stationary equilibrium
S = {G,∅} by PrSC(G). Since the outcome ∅ is realized in every period with probability
1/2, the probability of B is PrSC(B) =
1
2




















which yields PrSC(G) =
πL+πH
2(2+πL+πH)
. Finally, the stationary probability that a competent firm










Given these stationary probabilities for different types of firms, consumers’ posterior belief
upon observing a history h = GG is obtained using Bayes’ rule, and is denoted by µ̂S(h). It
follows that the firm’s profit conditional on the history GG is
µ̂S(GG) · πH + (1− µ̂S(GG)) · πL − c,
because the equilibrium requires the firm to invest after h = GG. The average expected
per-period profit of the firm is then a sum of profits over all possible histories, each weighted















PrSC(h2h1) · πL.︸ ︷︷ ︸
not invest
The first line of this equation is the expected payoff from investment, where the firm is paid
µ̂S ·πH + (1− µ̂S) ·πL, and incurs the investment cost c. The second line describes the firm’s
profit when it does not invest and is paid πL.
The average profit for a collective brand under the reputational equilibrium is computed
similarly. The price that the consumer pays after a history h2h1, p(h2h1), is described in
(4). The stationary distribution over histories depends on the type of the collective brand
ω ∈ {CC,CI, II}. The stationary probability PrSω(h2h1) of history h2h1 for a brand ω can









, PrII(GG) = π
2
L




Prω(h) · p(h)− c.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the reputational equilibrium exists for a collective brand but
not for an individual brand, that is ĉind < c < ĉcol.
1) Exclusive knowledge: If πL is close to 0 and consumers’ prior belief µ is close to 1, then
a competent firm prefers forming a collective brand with another firm to establishing an
individual brand, regardless of the type the other firm.
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2) Quality control: If πH is close to 1 and µ is close to 0, a competent firm always weakly
prefers to not brand.
Proposition 3 shows that for industries that require exclusive knowledge and have high
baseline reputation (µ ≈ 1), the commitment value of a collective brand induces competent
firms to want to brand with another firm regardless of its competency whenever it is socially
optimal to do so (i.e., ĉind < c < ĉcol). The reason is that the social planner’s incentives are
almost perfectly internalized when µ ≈ 1.
In the case of quality control, if µ is close to 0, a competent firm is better off as an
individual brand in the long run. Though a collective brand provides commitment power
for investment, with µ very small, the cost of an investment is not worth the reward. The
intuition is similar to the one in lemons markets. In a reputational equilibrium, consumers
are willing to pay µ̃ · πH + (1 − µ̃) · πL if their posterior is µ̃, and the firm incurs the cost
c. If the firm is expected to not invest in equilibrium, consumers pay πL. Then, roughly
speaking, the firm favors to be in the reputational equilibrium if µ̃ · (πH − πL) > c “on
average”. This condition is violated for a small µ̃, in which case the firm is better off not
investing.13 Thus, with endogenous brand formation, there is no investment in quality in
the market, even though investment is socially optimal.
Note that as long as the {G,∅} equilibrium exists, profits of a competent firm are always
higher for an individual brand than for a collective brand playing the reputational equilib-
rium.14 The reason is that in the {G,∅} equilibrium, the state in which the competent
firm does not invest, i.e., a B outcome, occurs with zero probability if πH ≈ 1. Thus, for
πH close to 1 (but not equal to 1), the collective brand yields strictly higher welfare than
the individual brand, while the firm prefers to be in an individual brand. Thus, the social
planner can improve total welfare by imposing collective brands such as country-of-origin
labeling.
13In the literature on adverse selection, this condition is frequently called the lemons condition.




In this section, we show that our results are robust to longer T - period memory of consumers.
In fact, our results become stronger in the following sense: the range of discount factors δ for
which collective brands provide commitment value (i.e., ĉind < ĉcol) is non-empty for all T
and in the limit, as T tends to infinity, it is larger than for 2-period memory. In particular,
in the case of exclusive knowledge, the set increases monotonically in T and converges to the
unit interval.
In general, with a longer memory, each individual investment becomes less important.
Thus, the benefit of investment decreases in T both for individual and collective brands.
However, the benefit of investment in individual brands is more adversely affected. The
intuition is identical to that for the 2-period memory. With a longer memory, an individual
brand can reach more extreme reputations following a sequence of good or bad outcomes.
Here, we only present the main results and briefly compare them to the 2-period memory
model described in Section 5. The detailed analysis of this case we have deferred in Appendix
B. The following proposition provides a generalization of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 4. (i) Exclusive knowledge: If πL is sufficiently close to 0 and µ is sufficiently
close to 1, then a collective brand sustains a reputational equilibrium for higher investment
costs than an individual brand (ĉind < ĉcol) if either δ < 1
2
, or (δ > 1
2
and (2δ)T > δ
1−δ ).
(ii) Quality control: If πH is sufficiently close to 1 and µ is sufficiently close to 0, then

















The following corollary follows immediately from this proposition.
Corollary 1. (i) Exclusive knowledge: If πL is sufficiently close to 0 and µ is sufficiently
close to 1, then the set of δ for which ĉindĉcol increases monotonically in T and converges to
[0, 1].
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(a) πL = 0 and µ = 1 (b) πH = 1, µ = 0 and πL = 4/5
Figure 5: Region in the T -δ space where ĉind > ĉcol.
(ii) Quality control: If πH is sufficiently close to 1 and µ is sufficiently close to 0, then
there is a T̄ > 2 such that for all T > T̄ , the set of δ that satisfies ĉind > ĉcol decreases
and converges to (0, πL
1+πL
). for any δ ∈ (0, πL
1+πL
], there is a large enough T̃ such that for all
T > T̃ , ĉind > ĉcol . Otherwise, if δ ∈ ( πL
1+πL
, 1), there is a large enough T̂ such that for all
T > T̂ , ĉind > ĉcol .
Figure 5 exhibits the range of parameters for which a collective brand induces stronger
incentives to invest than an individual brand. For the case of exclusive knowledge, a larger δ
requires a correspondingly larger memory T for collective brand to outperform an individual
brand, but for the case of quality control, longer memory requires δ not to be too large. In
particular, as T tends to infinity, it must be that δ ∈ (0, πL/(1 + πL))).
8 Conclusion
While we need to make some technical simplifications and focus on limiting cases, we believe
that we can highlight novel benefits of collective reputation building and the mechanisms
behind it. To conclud, we summarize the economic implications and interpretation of the
results in the context of country of origin labelling. Recall that the prior belief µ can be
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interpreted as the base reputation of firms in a country.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that in countries with strong base reputation (high µ) country
of origin labelling contributes to social welfare by improving firms’ ability to commit to invest
in quality in industries with exclusive knowledge such as French wine, Swiss watches, Ger-
man automobiles, Japanese electronics, US software, etc. In contrast, producers of generic
products such as screws, basic clothes, etc., in such countries should advertise their own
brand only. The exact opposite conclusion applies in countries with a weak base reputation
(low µ). In such countries, social welfare is maximized when manufacturers of generic goods
label their country of origin while manufacturers of specialized goods refrain from it.
These theoretical results are consistent with anecdotal evidence. For example the col-
lective brand “Made in China” is advertised by subsuppliers on platforms such as ‘Made-
in-China.com‘,” while successful high-tech companies such as Huawei try to build their own
brand names. On the other hand, German sub-suppliers of generics such as ThyssenKrupp
count on their own brand reputation. This distinction can also explain the choice of the
label “Made in Germany” versus “Made in Europe,” which is supposedly indicative of a
lower base reputation (lower µ).
As discussed in Section 6, the implementation of the optimal branding strategy might
require some government regulation if the base reputation of firms is low. Indeed, the
regulation of the labeling of country of origin is an important issue in many countries.
The standard argument is that firms should be required to label their product with certain
information for consumer protection. The insights developed here suggest that the type of
labeling, in particular the inclusion of country of origin, may affect the incentives of firms to
invest in quality positively.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Section 5
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 1] The posterior beliefs µ̂ind about the quality of the product after
observing history ht = ht−2ht−1 are given by
µ̂ind(GG) =
µπ2H
µπ2H + (1− µ)π2L
, µ̂ind(GB) = µ̂ind(BG) =
µπH(1− πH)




µ(1− πH)2 + (1− µ)(1− πL)2
, µ̂ind(G∅) = µ̂(∅G) =
µπH
µπH + (1− µ)πL
µ̂ind(∅∅) = µ, µ̂ind(B∅) = µ̂ind(∅B) =
µ(1− πH)
µ(1− πH) + (1− µ)(1− πL)
.
The reputational equilibrium exists if and only if a competent firm invests whenever visited
following all histories. Let us denote the value function when visited and not visited by
V ind(ht) and W
ind(ht), respectively. Also, let V
ind(ht; not) denote the payoff to a competent
firm from a single deviation. Then, V ind(ht) ≥ V ind(ht; not) for all ht, which is equivalent
to:









Note that d̄ind(h−1) can potentially depend on c. UsingW (h−2h−1) =
δ
2
(V (h−1∅) +W (h−1∅))
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we can calculate





ind(GG)− V ind(BG)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=pind(GG)−pind(BG)






(1− πH)(V ind(GB)− V ind(BB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=pind(GB)−pind(BB)
+W ind(GB)−W ind(BB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
).
Similarly, W ind(h−1G)−W ind(h−1B) = δ2(p
ind(G∅)− pind(B∅)).
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 2] First, note that
pind(GG)− pind(GB) = (πH − πL) ·
(
µπ2H
µπ2H + (1− µ)π2L
− µπH(1− πH)
µπH(1− πH) + (1− µ)πL(1− πL)
)
=




pind(GB)− pind(BB) = (πH − πL) ·
(
µπH(1− πH)
µπH(1− πH) + (1− µ)πL(1− πL)
− µ(1− πH)
2
µ(1− πH)2 + (1− µ)(1− πL)2
)
=




pind(G∅)− pind(B∅) = (πH − πL) ·
(
µπH
µπH + (1− µ)πL
− µ(1− πH)
µ(1− πH) + (1− µ)(1− πL)
)
=
µ(1− µ)(πH − πL)2
Pr(G) · Pr(B)
≥ min{pind(GG)− pind(GB), pind(GB)− pind(BB)}.
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Hence, the minimum is attained at h−1 = G if and only if
πHπL
Pr(GG) · Pr(GB)
≤ (1− πH)(1− πL)
Pr(GB) · Pr(BB)
⇔Pr(BB) · πHπL ≤ Pr(GG) · (1− πH)(1− πL)
⇔πHπL(µ(1− πH)2 + (1− µ)(1− πL)2) ≤ (1− πH)(1− πL)(µπ2H + (1− µ)π2L)
⇔µπH(1− πH) ≥ (1− µ)πL(1− πL)
This inequality holds if and only if µ ≥ µ̄ ≡ πL(1−πL)πH(1−πH)+πL(1−πL) .
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 3] Let us denote the present discounted expected equilibrium profit of a
competent firm when branding with a θ-type firm after history ht ∈ Hcol by V (ht, θ) if it is visited
and W (ht, θ) when it is not visited. Also, let the continuation payoff after no investment (assuming
the firm follows the equilibrium strategy after the deviation) be V (ht, θ; not). Then, a reputational
equilibrium exists if and only if V (ht, θ) ≥ V (ht, θ; not) for all ht, θ. A competent firm invests after
a history ht if and only if
c ≤ c̄col(ht−1) ≡ δ ·
πH − πL
2
· (V (ht−1G, θ)− V (ht−1B, θ) +W (ht−1G, θ)−W (ht−1B, θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡d̄col(ht−1,θ)
.
First, note that for all q1, q2, x ∈ {G,B}, we have that V (q1x, θ)− V (q2x, θ) = pcol(q1x)− pcol(q2x)
and W (q1x, θ)−W (q2x, θ) = 0. Using this, we can calculate




(V (GG, θ)− V (BG, θ)) + δ(1− πH)
2




(W (GG, θ)−W (BG, θ)) + δ(1− πH)
2
(W (GB, θ)− V (BB, θ))









W (h−1G, θ)−W (h−1B, θ) =
δπ(θ)
2
(V (GG, θ)− V (BG, θ)) + δ(1− π(θ))
2




(W (GG, θ)−W (BG, θ)) + δ(1− π(θ))
2




(pcol(GG)− pcol(BG)) + δ(1− π(θ))
2
(pcol(GB)− pcol(BB))
where π(θ) = πL if θ = I and πH if θ = C.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 4] As noted in Section 3, upon observing a history ht ∈ Hcol, a consumer
places a probability ηs(ht) on the group’s type s ∈ {CC,CI, IC, II}. These beliefs are given by:
ηCC(GG) =
µ2π2H










































ηII(GG) = 1− ηCC(GG)− 2ηCI(GG),
ηCC(GB) =
µ2πH(1− πH)






(πH(1− πH) + πH(1− πL) + πL(1− πH) + πL(1− πL))
µ2πH(1− πH) + 2µ(1− µ) 14 (πH(1− πH) + πH(1− πL) + πL(1− πH) + πL(1− πL)) + (1− µ)2πL(1− πL)
,
ηII(GB) = 1− ηCC(GB)− 2ηCI(GB),
ηCC(BB) =
µ2(1− πH)2































+ (1− µ)2(1− πL)2
,
ηII(BB) = 1− ηCC(BB)− 2ηCI(BB).
Then, the consumer’s posterior belief is about the firm being competent is given by Pr(ht) =
ηCC(ht) +
1
2(ηCI(ht) + ηIC(ht)) and thus, the price differentials are given by:





µ(1− µ)(πH + πL)2
Pr(GG)
−




µ(1− µ)(πH − πL)2
(
µ2(πH − πL)2 + 2µ(πH − πL)πL + πL(πH + πL)
)
4 · Pr(GG) · Pr(GB)
→πL→0
(1− µ)µπH
(1 + µ)(1− πH + 1− µπH)
pcol(GB)− pcol(BB) =
µ(1− µ)(πH − πL)2
(
µ2(πH − πL)2 − 2µ(πH − πL)(1− πL) + (1− πL)(2− πH − πL)
)




(1− µπH)2 + 1− πH
)
((1− µπH)2 + µ(1− πH)2 + 1− µ) (1− πH + 1− µπH)
.
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Thus, pcol(GG)− pcol(GB) ≤ pcol(GB)− pcol(BB) if and only if
µ2(πH − πL)2 + 2µ(πH − πL)πL + πL(πH + πL)
Pr(GG)
≤
µ2(πH − πL)2 − 2µ(πH − πL)(1− πL) + (1− πL)(2− πH − πL)
Pr(BB)
=
µ2(πH − πL)2 + 2µ(πH − πL)πL + πL(πH + πL)− (2µ− 1)(πH − πL) + 2(1− πH − πL)
Pr(GG)− µ(πH − πL)πL + 12
This condition can be re-written as AC ≤
A+B
C+D , where A = µ
2(πH−πL)2 +2µ(πH−πL)πL+πL(πH+
πL), B = −(2µ− 1)(πH − πL) + 2(1− πH − πL), C = Pr(GG), and D = −µ(πH − πL)πL + 12 . This
holds if and only if AD ≤ BC which can be rewritten as
(πH − πL)
(




Note that if µ = 1, the LHS is equivalent to 2(1 − πH)πH ≥ 0 and if µ = 0, it is equivalent to
−2(1− πL)πL ≤ 0. As f is a continuous function, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, it vanishes
at least once for some value of µ between 0 and 1. The question is whether it is zero more than
once. To this end, note that f is increasing in µ if and only if
∂f
∂µ
= µ(µ− 1) + (πH + πL)(2− πH − πL)
6(πH − πL)2
> 0⇔ (1− µ)µ < (πH + πL)(2− πH − πL)
6(πH − πL)2
First, if πH − πL is small, RHS is large and the condition holds always, so f crosses 0 at a single
point. If πH − πL is sufficiently large, then the condition holds for small and large values of µ.
Then, though f(0, πH , πL) < 0, it increases in µ for µ close to 0, at which point f may cross 0
for the first time. Then, for intermediate values of µ, f decreases and may cross 0 one more time.
Then, lastly f increases for large values of µ and cross 0 again.
Although we do not fully identify necessary and sufficient conditions for f ≥ 0, under symmetric
signals with πL = 1 − πH < 12 , f(µ, πH , 1 − πH) ≥ 0 if and only if
1






















2 , 1]. This coincides with the
patter described above.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1] From Lemma 2 it follows that c̄ind(G) determines the cutoff cost
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for all parameters if πL = 0 and 0 < πH < 1. Also, though not straightforward from Lemma
4, it implies that ĉcol = c̄col(G;C) for πL = 0 for high and low values of µ. This is because
pcol(GG)−pcol(GB) ≤ pcol(GB)−pcol(BB) if and only if either µ < 12 , or µ ≥
1
2 and πH <
2
1+3µ−2µ2 .
So, we compare ĉind(G) = δ · πH−πL2 · c̄
ind(G) and ĉcol(G;C) = δ · πH−πL2 · c̄
col(G;C).



































:= πH(1− µ) ·X ind(µ, πH)
where X ind(µ, πH) →
µ→1
δ






col(GG)− pcol(GB)) + δ(1− πH)(pcol(GB)− pcol(BB))
= (1 + δπH) ·
(1− µ)µπH
(1 + µ)(2− (1 + µ)πH)
+δ · (1− πH) ·
(1− µ)πH (2− πH(1 + µ(2− µπH)))
((1− µπH)2 + µ(1− πH)2 + 1− µ) (2− (1 + µ)πH)
:= (1− µ)πH ·Xcol(µ, πH).
As µ approaches 1, we get
lim
µ→1

















col ≥ limµ→1X ind if and only if 1+2δ4(1−πH) ≥
δ
1−πH , i.e., if and only if δ <
1
2 . for





πH(1−µ) , we have proven that for µ close to 1, we can find πL close to 0 such that
ĉcol ≥ ĉind.
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Clearly, δ · 2−πH2 > δ ·
1−πH
2 for all πH ∈ (0, 1). So, for a µ close 0, there is a πL close to 0 such that
ĉind ≥ ĉcol.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 2] Here, set πH = 1 and 0 < πL < 1. It follows from Lemma 2 that
ĉind = cind(B). Similarly, ĉcol = ccol(B; I) for high and low values of µ.





(pind(GB)− pind(BB)) + δ
2














· Y ind(µ, πL).
Under a collective brand,
lim
πH→1









· Y col(µ, πL)





To make a comparison for µ close to 0, it is sufficient to compare Y ind and Y col in that region:
lim
µ→0





Y col(µ, πL) =




col > limµ→0 Y
ind if and only if δ < 2πL3+πL . Thus, for µ close to 0 and πH close to 1,
ĉcol ≥ ĉind, if and only if δ < 2πL3+πL .
If µ is close to 1,
lim
µ→1







ind(B) > limµ→1 c̄(B; I). Therefore, for any µ close to 1, we can find πH close to 1 such
that ĉind ≥ ĉcol
A.2 Proofs of Section 6
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 5] For all equilibria other than the reputational equilibrium and no in-
vestment equilibrium, the firm sometimes invest and other times not. This implies the cost of
investment cannot be too small or too large and the necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of each of any equilibrium S is given by CS(µ, πH , πL) < c < C
S




Repeating the steps taken to find the cutoff levels ĉcol for collective and ĉind for individual brands,
we obtain the following expressions for cutoffs for each equilibrium.
Exclusive knowledge: First, consider the case of exclusive knowledge, i.e. πL = 0 and µ close
to 1. Note that limµ→1 limπL→0 ĉ
col = 0 and limµ→1 limπL→0 ĉ
ind = 0.









































Therefore, there is no c > 0 such that ĉind(µ, πH , 0) < c < ĉ(µ, πH , 0) for µ close to 1 that satisfy
CS(µ, πH , 0) < c < C
S
(µ, πH , 0).















Therefore, these equilibria only exist when the investment cost is negative, and hence do not exist
in our setup.
Then, the only two equilibria that need to be checked are S = {G,B} and {∅}. These two
equilibria demonstrate strategies non-monotonic in the firm’s reputation in the sense that the
firm takes the same action following a good and bad outcome, but a different one following an
empty outcome. We can show that these do not exist. First, suppose S = {G,B} so that the
firm invests unless its recent outcome is {∅}. That the firm finds it optimal to invest following
a good outcome implies c < πH−πL2 (V
S(GG) − V S(GB)), and the same about a bad outcome
c < πH−πL2 (V
S(BG)−V S(BB)). On the other hand, the firm should not invest following an empty
outcome, and therefore c > πH−πL2 (V
S(∅G)− V S(∅B)). Therefore, the equilibrium exists if
∆π
2




(V S(xG)− V S(xB)).
Clearly, this is only possible if V S(∅G) − V S(∅B) < minx∈{G,B} V S(xG) − V S(xB). Since the
firm’s investment decision only depends on the most recent outcome, the future payoffs in V S(yG)
and V S(yB) are independent of y ∈ {G,∅, B}. Therefore, the inequality entires hinges on the
immediate prices, and thus holds if and only if pS(∅G)− pS(∅B) < minx∈{G,B} pS(xG)− pS(xB).
If πL = 0, the right-hand side is zero for x = G, as one good outcome reveals the firm to be
competent. Therefore, the inequality cannot hold. If πH = 1, x = B causes the right-hand side to
vanish. Therefore, such non-monotonic equilibria do not exist.






(V S(xG)− V S(xB)) < c < ∆π
2
(V S(∅G)− V S(∅B)).
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There exists some c that satisfies the condition if and only if maxx∈{G,B} p
S(xG) − pS(xB) <
pS(∅G) − pS(∅B). But both the left- and right-hand side are zero, as the firm does not invest
following a good or bad outcome. Therefore, such equilibrium cannot exist if πL = 0 or πH = 1.
Quality control: Now consider the region where πH = 1 and µ is close to 0. We already ruled
out existence of two equilibria: S = {G,B}, and {∅}. We now show that, for ĉind < c < ĉcol,
{B,∅} do not in the limit, by verifying CS < ĉind. (Recall an equilibrium S exists if and only if
CS < c < C
S
.)






δ2µ(1− πL)3(1 + πL)













ĉind = δµ(1− πL)2 ·
δ(πL(1 + πL) + µ(2− πL − π2L))






= δµ(1− πL)2 ·
δ(1− πL)






= δµ(1− πL)2 ·
δ(1− πL)(1 + πL)







converge to zero as µ approaches 0. In
order to make a comparison in a close neighborhood of µ = 0, we eliminate a common factor and





δ(πL(1 + πL) + µ(2− πL − π2L))















δ(1− πL)(1 + πL)













4(3−πL)πL , which proves the non-existence
of these equilibria.
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Next, we show the existence of two equilibria, S = {G} and {G,∅} in the relevant parameter
region. We show this by showing that, in that region, the interval (CS , C
S
) contains (ĉind, ĉcol),
i.e. CS < ĉind and C
S








δ(1− µ)(2− πL)(1 + πL) + 2(πL + π2L + µ(2− πL − π2L))
4(1− (1− µ)πL)(πL(1 + πL) + µ(2− πL − π2L))
=








(4 + (1− µ)πL(4 + δ(2− πL)(1 + πL)))
4(1− (1− µ)πL)(πL(1 + πL) + µ(2− πL − π2L))
=
4 + δ(2− πL)πL
4(1 + πL)πL
.










































2πL + δ(1 + 3πL)
16π2L
.






, and ĉind with C{G,∅} and C{G}.
First, ĉcol < C
{G,∅}
and ĉind > C{G,∅}, implying that the {G,∅}−equilibrium exists whenever
δ < 2πL3+πL . Furthermore, ĉ
col < C
{G}




and only if δ >
2π2L
1+2∗πL .
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3] Under the case of exclusive knowledge, the only equilibrium for an
individual brand is the “no investment” equilibrium. In this equilibrium, its average profits are given
by limµ→1 limπL→0 Π
ind ≈ πL ≈ 0. In a collective brand, regardless of the other firm’s competency,
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the firm’s average profit in a reputation equlibrium is given by limµ→1 limπL→0 Π
col = πH − c.
Therefore, the firm always prefers branding with another firm to staying alone as long as c < πH
with is the case by assumption.
For quality control industries, two equilibria can exist for an individual firm: S = {G,∅},
{G}. We compare profits under these equilibria to identify the best alternative to the reputational
equilibrium. limµ→0 limπH→1 Π




these profits are less than limµ→0 limπH→1 Π
∅ = πL, and therefore an individual brand’s best
alternative is the bad equilibrium. If it forms a group with another firm, regardless of the type,
limµ→0 limπH→1 Π
col = πL − c under the reputational equilibrium. For a collective brand too, the
no investment equilibrium exists, and there the firm secures a profit of πL. Therefore, the firm is
indifferent between two types of brand.
A.3 Proof of Section 7
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4] For the good news case with πL = 0, we compare the cutoff levels
















This holds if and only if either δ ≤ 12 , or δ >
1
2 and (2δ)
T > δ1−δ . Because (2δ)
T is increasing in T for
δ > 12 , there is a large enough T̄ (δ) such that for all T > T̄ (δ), (21) holds. This implies that a longer
memory expands the region of δ under which a collective brand sustains the reputational equilibrium




4 ≈ 0.809), and if
T = 4, δ ∈ (0, 0.919).
For the bad news case with πH = 1, the cutoff level for a collective brand is greater than that of
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an individual brand for µ close to 0 if limµ→0 limπH→1
∆ZcolI (B
T−1)































> δT−1 · (1 + πL
πL
)T−1. (10)
Proof. [Proof of Corollary 1]
The first result regarding the case of exclusive technology (πL = 0 and µ close to 1) follows
immediately from the equation (21).
For the second result, we investigate the equation (22). Note that the left-hand side converges as
T goes to ∞ if and only if δ(1+3πL)2πL < 1, which is equivalent to δ <
2πL
1+3πL
. Likewise, the right-hand




So, first, if δ < πL1+πL , (22) holds for a large enough T . It is straight-forward to show the same
is true for δ = πL1+πL . Second, if
πL
1+πL
< δ < 2πL1+3πL , the left-hand side converges, but the right-hand




, the right-hand side is greater for a large enough T . This completes the
proof.
B Appendix: T−Period Memory
In this section, we extend our analysis to a T -period memory for T > 2. With a T−period memory,
a relevant history at period t is of the form ht ∈ Hind := {G,∅, B}T for an individual brand and
ht ∈ Hcol := {G,B}T for a collective brand. The history consists of outcomes produced in the
previous T periods, ht = ht−Tht−T+1 · · ·ht−1. As time proceeds, consumers’ new history consists
of the most recent outcomes from ht and new outcomes. Let us denote the n most recent outcomes
by hnt = ht−n · · ·ht−1 for any 1 ≤ n ≤ T .
As in Section 5, we start by finding conditions under which the reputational equilibrium exists
for an individual and a collective brand. Then, we compare the respective parameter regions to find
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where the equilibrium exists under a collective, but not under an individual brand. The analysis is
similar to that in Section 5, so to avoid redundancy, we omit repetitive details.
B.1 Individual brand
In a reputational equilibrium, a competent firm must find it optimal to invest after anyl history.
To rule out profitable deviations, we consider the firm’s investment decision at period t (also often
referred as today) when the firm will invest whenever visited in the future. By investing, it can
add a ht = G to the history ht with a greater probability, which will be remembered in the next T
periods. k + 1 periods after period t, consumers would have forgotten the k + 1 oldest outcomes,
and k + 1 new outcomes are added to the relevant history
ht+k+1 = h
T−k−1





The new outcomes are denoted by hth
k
t+k+1, where ht is the result of the focal investment de-
cision. To simplify the notation and to distinguish the known (old) outcomes and those to
be realized, we denote future outcomes hkt+k+1. Then, conditional on realizing the future out-
comes f, the benefit of investing in period t comes from a probabilistic improvement in the his-






t+k+1. This allows the firm to receive a higher price
pind(hT−k−1t Gh
k
t+k+1)−pind(hT−k−1t Bhkt+k+1). The total expected benefit from a decision to invest
today then is a sum of such price differences, weighted according to the probability of realizing
hkt+k+1 and accounting for an appropriate discounting.
So, we can compute the benefit of an investment for each history. Then, the reputational
equilibrium exists if and only if the cost of investment is less than the minimum of benefits over all
histories. We summarize this in the next lemma, which is a general statement of Lemma 1.
Lemma 6. For an individual firm, there exists a constant ĉind > 0 such that the reputatoinal


















Proof. [Proof of Lemma 6] As in Lemma 1, we obtain an expression for the cutoff in terms of price
differences. We find it useful to define a new value function before the consumer’s visit. Let Z(ht)
be the expected payoff to the firm in equilibrium:




· Z ind(hT−1t G) +
1− πH
2
· Z ind(hT−1t B) +
1
2
· Z ind(hT−1t ∅)
)
.
As the consumer visits the firm with probability 12 , the firm’s expected period-t profit is
1
2(p(ht)−c).
The expected future payoff depends on the realized outcome in the current period. The firm





Once the firm is visited, it should be optimal for the firm to invest always, i.e., V (ht) ≥
V (ht; not) for all ht ∈ Hind where
V ind(ht) = p(ht)− c+ δ(πH · Z ind(hT−1t G) + (1− πH) · Z ind(h
T−1
t B)),
V ind(ht; not) = p(ht) + δ(πL · Z ind(hT−1t G) + (1− πL) · Z ind(h
T−1
t B)).
By investing in quality, the firm is able to produce a good outcome with a greater probability
πH , which improves the future payoffs. Then, the condition for the existence of the reputational
equilibrium can be expressed as a cutoff-rule; the invest cost is always less than its benefit. So,
c ≤ ĉind := δ(πH − πL) · min
hT−1t ∈{G,∅,B}T−1
∆Z ind(hT−1t ), (12)
where ∆Z ind(hT−1t ) := Z
ind(hT−1t G) − Z ind(h
T−1
t B). The firm is able to receive a higher price
in the next T periods due to the good outcome produced today. For this reason, ∆Z(hT−1t ) is
a present-discounted weighted-sum of price premiums, as we saw in the analysis for two-period
memory:
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The future payoff, conditional on producing a good outcome, is






























































Given a history hT−1t G, the relevant history k periods later becomes h
T−k−1Gf . That is,
consumers replace oldest k memories with a new memory realized throughout k periods, i.e., f ∈ Hk.
Conditional on the realization of f , the firm’s period-profit is p(hT−k−1Gf) − c. This realization
occurs with a probability denoted by Pr(f). Accouting for these probabilities and discounting, we
obtain the first double sum in the equation. Once T periods have passed and consumers no longer
remember the good outcome of the investment made in period t, the firm’s relevant history can be
any g ∈ HT . So, we obtain the second double sum by weighting and discounting each period-profit
appropriately. The firm receives a period-profit if and only if the consumer visits, and therefore we
divide the whole expression by 2.
To compute Pr(f), counting the number of good, bad and empty histories is just enough, as
the order of each outcome does not matter. Let Nh(ht) for h ∈ H and ht ∈ HT be the count of
an outcome of type h in the T -period history ht. For example, NG(G∅G) = 2, NB(G∅G) = 0 and
N∅(G∅G) = 1. Suppose NG(f) = i, NB(f) = j, and N∅(f) = l, respectively, such that i+j+ l = k.
Then, Pr(f) = (πH2 )
i ·(1−πH2 )
j(12)
l. The next two lines in the equation are results of simply plugging
in these probabilities.
Likewise, the future payoff to the firm if it produced a bad outcome would be












































Therefore, subtracting the two gives
























Plugging this into (12) completes the proof.
To obtain an explicit expression for ĉind, we need to uncover the minimum operator by identi-
fying the binding history for different parameter regions. As in the two-period memory case, we
focus on two special signal structures: exclusive knowledge (πL = 0) and quality control (πH = 1).
The former provides an environment where building an extremely high level of reputation is easy
for a competent firm, as one good outcome completely reveals its type. Therefore, we can attain
the minimum by choosing a history that has a lasting damage to the firm’s incentives. This implies
that any history hT−1t with ht−1 = G does the job. Since the most recent outcome in the history is
good, consumers know perfectly the firm’s type to be good until t = T − 1. This eliminates all the
benefits to be realized until period t+ T − 1. The only expression that survives in equation (11) is
the very last period (t+ T ) when ht−1 = G will have been forgotten. As this benefit is discounted
by δT , a longer history clearly hurts investment incentives for an individual brand.
Under the structure of quality control (πH = 1), one bad outcome completely reveals a firm to
be an incompetent type. Then, similarly, any history with ht−1 = B attains the minimum because
it puts a bad stamp on the brand for until period t+ T − 1. Then, all benefits other than ones to
be realized in the very last period (t+ T ), again discounted by δT .
Therefore, limπL→0 ĉ
ind = limπL→0 c̄
ind(ht) where ht−1 = G, and limπH→1 ĉ
ind = limπH→1 c̄
ind(gt)
where gt−1 = B. We state next lemma with characterization of the cutoff once we take limits for
µ, as we will use these cutoffs for comparison later.15
Lemma 7. (i) In an the environment with exclusive knowledge (πL = 0), a history in which the











15Please see the appendix for the cutoffs prior to taking limits of µ.
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(ii). In an environment with quality control (πH = 1), a history in which the most recent










· (1 + πL
πL
)T−1. (14)
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 7] (Identify the binding constraint for two cases and then compute the
cutoff-level.) As the exact cutoff level involves a minimum operator, we need to compare ∆Z(hT−1t )
for all hT−1t ∈ {G,B,∅}. Obtaining an explicit formula for it is not feasible. Instead, we focus on
two special signal structures–πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1) and πH = 1, πL ∈ (0, 1).
First, suppose πL = 0, πH ∈ (0, 1). This is the case of exclusive technology where a good
outcome reveals the firm to be competent. So, µ(h) = 1 if and only if NG(h) ≥ 1. Here, the price
p(h) = πH · µ(h). So,
p(hT−1−kGf)− p(hT−1−kBf) = πH · (µ(hT−1−kGf)− µ(hT−1−kBf))
= πH · (1− µ(hT−1−kBf)).
This vanishes if and only if NG(h
T−1−kBf) ≥ 1, i.e. there is at least one good outcome in this
history. To find a history that minimizes ∆Z(·), we want as many of the price difference as possible
to vanish. For this purpose, it suffices to have h−1 = G. Recall h−1 is the outcome produced a
period before the focal investment decision. So, the good outcome reveals the firm’s competence
until it is forgotten T periods later. So, with h−1 = G, p(h
T−1−kGf) − p(hT−1−kBf) = 0 for all
f ∈ Hk for 0 ≤ k ≤ T − 2. For k = T − 1, h−1 is forgotten and the relevant price premium is








That is, all benefits other than the one realized in the last period vanish. And, this part is
independent of h, the history at the time of investment decision. Therefore, h−1 = G indeed
attains the minimum for ∆Z(·).
Clearly, p(Gf)− p(Bf) again vanishes for any NG(f) ≥ 1. Therefore, terms that survive in the
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µ(1− πH)j+1 + (1− µ)
 .
The first equality holds because µ̂(GBj∅T−1−j) = 1 because a good history causes a full revelation,
and µ̂(Bj+1∅T−1−j) = µ(1−πH)
j+1
µ(1−πH)j+1+1−µ
. Simply plugging into (12) proves the lemma for πL = 0 and






Now, consider the case where πH = 1 and πL ∈ (0, 1). Here, a bad outcome is revealing of
a firm’s incompetence. Therefore, µ(h) = 0 if and only if NB(h) ≥ 1, and p(h) = πL. We omit
details for this case, as it is very similar to the previous case.
From (B.1), h−1 = B attains the minimum for ∆Z
ind(·). Then, all price premiums other than















































As we see in equations (13) and (14), the expected benefit to be realized in the last
period is a weighted sum, depending on realization of f, the future outcomes following the
focal investment decision at period t. The price differences are of the form pind(Gf)−pind(Bf),
where f ∈ {G,∅, B}T−1. Under πL = 0, if any outcome in f is G, the difference vanishes,
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as one good outcome reveals the firm to be competent. So, the summation accounts for the
cases where f ∈ {∅, B}T−1, i.e. only bad or empty outcomes constitute f. Likewise, under
πH = 1, the price difference vanishes if and only if there is a B in f. So, (14) sums over the
cases f ∈ {G,∅}T−1.16
B.2 Collective brand
A longer memory may have a similar adverse effect on short-run incentives for collective
brands. However, as we saw in the analysis of the two-period model, consumers’ limited
observability for a collective brand alleviates this problem; as consumers cannot observe
history at firm-level, they can never learn perfectly about the types of two firms in the
group. Therefore, a competent firm can always improve the brand reputation by investing
in quality.
The next lemma establishes the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
reputational equilibrium. Let Pr(f ; θ) for f ∈ {G,B}k and θ ∈ {C, I} with 0 ≤ k ≤ T be
the probability that the brand of type θ produces a sequence of outcome f in k periods if a
competent firm always invests.
Lemma 8. For a competent firm within a collective brand, there exists a constant ĉ > 0
such that a RE exists if and only if c ≤ ĉ where
ĉcol = min
hT−1t ,θ













where hT−1t ∈ {G,B}T−1 and θ ∈ {C, I}.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 8] As this lemma is a straightforward generalization of lemma 3,
we omit many details. Also, we adopt notation from the proof for 6. Let Zcolθ (ht) denote
the payoff to a competent firm of a collective brand before the customer’s visit. θ ∈ {C, I}
denotes the other firm’s type, which determines the brand’s type, s ∈ {CC,CI}.





(p(ht)− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected current period
+δ
πH + π(θ)2 · Zcolθ (hT−1t G) + (1− πH + π(θ)2 ) · Zcolθ (hT−1t B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
future profit
 .
In the current period the firm makes p(ht)− c if visited and 0 otherwise. In the next period,
the brand will face a history hT−1t G or h
T−1
t B depending on today’s investment outcome,
which also depends on the type of the other firm. So, on average, the firm produces a G
with a probability πH+π(θ)
2
and a B otherwise.
Once the firm is visited, it should be optimal for the firm to invest always. After a
history ht, a firm’s payoff conditional on being visited is denoted by V
col
θ (ht). Then, we need
V colθ (ht) ≥ V colθ (ht; not) for all ht ∈ Hcol.
V colθ (ht) = p(ht)− c+ δ(πH · Zcolθ (hT−1t G) + (1− πH) · Zcolθ (hT−1t B)),
V colθ (ht; not) = p(ht) + δ(πL · Zcolθ (hT−1t G) + (1− πL) · Zcolθ (hT−1t B)).
This is equivalent to











t G)− Zcolθ (hT−1t B).












































Pr(g; θ)(p(g)− c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
After T Periods
54
In each period, the brand produces a G with a probability πH+π(θ)
2
and a B with the com-
plementary probility. Therefore, for any ht ∈ Hcol, if NG(ht) = i and NB(ht) = j = t − i,





































Plugging this into (16) completes the proof.
This lemma generalizes lemma 3. The cutoff now depends on the type of the other firm,
as it affects realization of future outcomes f through Pr(f; θ). Also, prices here are different
from those in the individual brand because conditional on a history, posterior beliefs are
different.
None of these price differences in equation (15) vanish even for πL = 0 and πH = 1. And,
which history and type provide the binding constraint is less clear for a collective brand. To
characterize the cutoff level, we take limits for µ, the prior belief.
First, for πL = 1, consider µ close to 1. Then, a good outcome is informative. However,
the informativeness of each additional good outcome must be decreasing. For example,
having one good outcome compared to none is quite desirable, as it reveals the existence of
at least one competent firm. But, having a fifth good outcome in the history in addition to
an existing four is not as appealing, as consumers already believe with a high probability
that both firms are competent. So, in this parameter region, the binding constraint would be
provided by an environment that produces as many good outcomes as possible. Naturally,
hT−1t = G
T−1 and θ = C would do the job.
Second, for πH = 1, let focus on µ close to 0. Then, while a bad outcome is informative,
it’s informativeness decreases as there are more bad outcomes in the history. So, the binding
condition would be provided by hT−1t = B
T−1 and θ = I, as together they produce as many
55
bad outcomes as possible in the brand’s history.
Then, we can compute the cutoff levels explicitly:
Lemma 9. (i) Under the environment of exclusive technology (πL = 0), if µ is close to 1,














(ii) Under the quality control (πH = 1), if µ is close to 0, ĉ





















Proof. [Proof of Lemma 9] The exact cutoff levels in lemma 8 is a discounted sum of price
premiums over T periods. It is not feasible to obtain an explicit expression for general
parameter regions. So, we again focus on two parameter regions: πL = 0 and πH = 1.
Before we shift our focus to these cases, we find it useful to understand posterior beliefs
denoted by η(·). Facing a collective brand, consumers update beliefs over types of the brand,
s ∈ {CC,CI, IC, II}, and use this to compute the probability of visiting a competent firm:
η(·) = ηCC(·) + 12(ηCI(·) + ηIC(·)). So, η(ht), if NG(ht) = i, is
η(ht) =









)T−i + (1− µ)2 · πiL(1− πL)T−i
(20)
It is infeasible to obtain an explicit expression for ∆Zθ(·), not to mention the overall cutoff,
c̄col. As we did in previous analyses, we i) focus on two signal structures (πL = 0 and πH = 1),
ii) identify the binding history and the brand type, and iii) obtain a lower bound ccol for the
cutoff.
First, consider the case πL = 0. Then, after a history ht, the consumer pays p(ht) = η(ht)·
πH . The reputational benefit realized in each period is the price difference made available




T−1−kBf) + 1. And, here we claim that this difference is
decreasing in i for a large enough µ. That is, when πL = 0 and µ is large, the price premium
reduces as the number of good outcomes becomes large. If this were true, hT−1t = G
T−1 and
θ = C would provide the minimum for ∆Zθ(h
T−1
t ), as these two conditions both places the
brand under histories with more good outcomes. We formally state this and prove:
Claim 1. Suppose πL = 0 and µ is close to 1. And let NG(h
T−1−kBf) = i. Then,
p(hT−1−kGf)−p(hT−1−kBf) is decreasing in i. Then, the price premium from the investment
is low when there are many good outcomes in the history. So, hT−1t = G
T−1 and θ = C attains
the minimum for ∆Zθ(h
T−1
t ), and hence are the binding condition for the cutoff level, c̄
col.
The intuition is the following. As long as there is a good outcome in the history, con-
sumers believe the brand has either one or two competent firms. But, as they see more good
outcomes, they become more convinced that both firms are competent. As more good out-
comes resolve consumers’ uncertainty, the price difference becomes small. Mathematically,
η(r1)− η(r2) =











































































which is clearly decreasing in i. Therefore, for any positive integer T , there is a µ̄ close
enough to 1 so that the difference in beliefs (and thus prices) is decreasing in i, the number
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of good outcomes in the history. This completes the proof for the claim.























































Next, we consider the case πH = 1. Then, the price consumer pays after a history ht
is p(ht) = η(ht) + (1 − η(ht))πL. In this setting, a bad outcome is very informative, as it
reveals existence of an incompetent firm in the brand. And, intuitively as there are more bad
outcomes in the history, informativeness of each bad outcome decrease. Therefore, the price
premium to be realized k period after the focal investment decision conditional on the new
outcomes f is p(hT−1−kGf)−p(hT−1−kBf), and this decreases in i, where i = NG(hT−1−kBf).
We state it formally in the next claim.
Claim 2. Suppose πH = 0 and µ is close to 0. And let NG(h
T−1−kBf) = i. Then,
p(hT−1−kGf) − p(hT−1−kBf) is increasing in i. Then, hT−1t = BT−1 and θ = I attains the
minimum for ∆Zθ(h
T−1
t ), and hence are the binding condition for the cutoff level, c̄
col.
η(GT ) =
µ2 + µ(1− µ) · (1+πL
2
)T
µ2 + 2µ(1− µ) · (1+πL
2
)T + (1− µ)2 · πTL
η(h) =









)T−i + (1− µ)2 · πiL(1− πL)T−i
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Then, η(r1)− η(r2) =









)T−i−1 + (1− µ)2 · πi+1L (1− πL)T−i−1
−









)T−i + (1− µ)2 · πiL(1− πL)T−i
Then, taking η(r1)−η(r2)
µ























This is clearly increasing in i. Therefore, there is a µ̄πH=1 close enough to 0 so that the
difference in beliefs (and thus prices) is increasing in i, the number of good outcomes in the
history. This completes the proof for the claim.

















































































Even in the limits, benefits of investment for a collective brand do not vanish, and the
cutoff turns out to be a sum of what turns out to be a finite geometric sequence. Unlike the
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cutoff for an individual brand, the cutoff is not discounted by δT , so it decreases in T as a
much slower rate. This highlights the advantage of collective brands over individual ones.
B.3 Comparing Individual and Collective Brands
It remains to find out when ĉcol is greater than ĉind for two special parameter regions by
comparing equations (13) and (18), and (14) and (19).
Proposition 5. (i) If πL = 0, and µ close to 1, ĉ











(ii) If πH = 1, and µ close to 0, ĉ
















Proposition 4 shows that for any history length, we can find regions where a collective
brand sustains the reputational equilibrium better than an individual brand does. In fact, a
longer memory expands the region of δ that supports our result for the case of πL = 0. This
is because when δ > 1
2
, 2δ > 1, so the left-hand side increases in T . For example, if T = 2,
ĉcol > ĉind for δ ∈ (0, 1
2




≈ 0.809), and if T = 4, δ ∈ (0, 0.919).
The case of πH = 1 is more complicated. Because the left-hand side is always increasing
in T , (22) is more likely to hold if δ(1+πL)
πL
≤ 1. Otherwise, if δ(1+πL)
πL
> 1, the right-hand
side diverges as T goes to infinity. So, in order for the condition to hold, the left-hand side





< δ < 2πL
1+3πL
, the condition holds only for a small enough T . If δ > 2πL
1+3πL
, we can show
that the condition cannot hold for T too large.
Corollary 2. If πL = 0 and µ close to 1, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), there is a large enough T̄ such
that for all T > T̄ , ĉcol > ĉind. If πH = 1 and µ close to 0, for any δ ∈ (0, πL1+πL ], there is a
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large enough T̃ such that for all T > T̃ , ĉcol > ĉind. Otherwise, if δ ∈ ( πL
1+πL
, 1), there is a
large enough T̂ such that for all T > T̂ , ĉind > ĉcol.
61
